Sir Samuel Hoare | Series of c.110 letters to Lord Beaverbrook, 1920-50

Sir Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood

Series of c.110 autograph or typed letters signed ("Sam"), to Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook (Dear Max")

an important correspondence covering a wide range of political subjects, most written from within government or as Ambassador to Spain, c.238 pages, 4to and 8vo, House of Commons, 18 Cadogan Gdns, the Air Ministry, India Office, Home Office, British Embassy in Madrid, and other locations, 8 June 1921 to 25 April 1950, occasional staining and nicks[with:] 14 photographs of Hoare, each with Daily Express copyright stamp

Samuel Hoare (1880-1959), created Viscount Templewood in 1944, was a leading Conservative politician. He served in intelligence in Russia and Italy during World War I; was the MP for Chelsea from 1910 to 1944; and held several Cabinet positions including Home Secretary (1937-39), Foreign Secretary (1935), Secretary of State for India (1931-35) and Secretary of State for Air (1922-29 and 1940). His historical reputation has suffered from his close association with the policy of Appeasement and especially the Hoare-Laval pact, which accepted the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. This long series of letters to the press baron and wartime minister Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, provides a wealth of insight into the foreign policy views of a quintessential figure of the British establishment, as well as the inner workings of the Conservative party.

The correspondence revolves chiefly on matters of policy, especially international affairs. When the correspondence begins in 1921, Hoare is focused the question of Ireland, then in the midst of its War of Independence, and one of the earliest letters includes a coruscating attack on British intelligence failures ("...Having run our Secret Service in Russia and Italy for four years, I know enough of intelligence methods to convince the Prime Minister that his show in Ireland was rotten from top to bottom...", 13 June 1921). In other letters, Hoare writes of the Middle East (“…'the Jewish and Arab States must now pay for themselves…”, October 1921), the rise of Fascism ("...the disclosures of your correspondent in Verlain have made a great impression in Germany and Hitler and his crowd were considerably disquieted by them...", 3 July 1934), and other subjects. For much of the time Hoare was a Cabinet Minister ("...Stanley Baldwin has asked me to enter the cabinet...", 25 May 1923), and many letters turn on the attitude of Beaverbrook's papers to policy areas under his ministerial purview, from the promotion of air travel to discontent in India.

Other letters provide insights into leading figures in the Tory party, including Neville Chamberlain ("...He has, as we all know, a very cold manner. I always think that it is chiefly due to shyness and that behind it there is a very great deal of sentiment, particularly Imperial sentiment..." 27 July 1934). The biggest personality in the party was of course Churchill, who figures in many letters, such as when Hoare recounts a visit to Chartwell on 15 February 1926: "Most of the Sunday morning we inspected the property, and the engineering works upon which he is engaged. These engineering works consist of making a series of ponds in a valley, and Winston appears to be a great deal more interested in them than in anything else in the world." Their exuberant host "scarcely stopped talking the whole time [...] His is convinced that he is to be the prophet to lead us into the Promised Land".

Hoare was one of the most prominent figures associated with the policy of Appeasement. In 1943, when Beaverbrook was planning a book on the lead-up to war, Hoare reflected on pre-war policies: "It was an atmosphere of peace at almost any price: the peace ballot, the Labour opposition against Service estimate and conscription, the pressure of business and industry against war. Neville was not the man to fight this opposition, for at the bottom of his heart he sympathised with it" (15 February 1943). When war came Hoare was appointed to Chamberlain's inner war cabinet, and the correspondence includes a hurried note from this time ("...you may have thought that he had asked you to come to see him for the purpose of offering you the ministry of Information. He wanted me to tell you that he could not make this offer as Macmillan was not resigning...", 28 October 1939). However, when Churchill came to power Hoare found himself out of political office, and was instead sent to Madrid as Ambassador.

Hoare arrived in Spain to find a widespread expectation of imminent German victory ("...Nine Spaniards out of ten believe that Hitler will win the war in three weeks...", 6 June 1940). He soon announces to Beaverbrook that "I am making myself the centre of the movement against the Spanish entry into the war" (21 June 1940), explaining that whilst Franco's regime might be sympathetic to Germany, and German influence in Spain ran deep, exhaustion from the Civil War had left the Spanish with neither the appetite nor the materiel for another war. The swift Germany victory over France altered the situation ("...You can imagine the state of nerves here with the Germans on the Pyrenees..." 27 June 1940), and brought to Spain a flood of refugees, including the Duke of Windsor. Hoare soon finds himself having to tackle rumours that "I was making a peace with Germany through the medium of the Duke of Windsor" (5 July 1940). He offers policy suggestion, most remarkably perhaps that Morocco be offered to Spain as a colony ("...is it worth using Morocco as the bridge over which we can bring the Spaniards from the Berlin side to our own [...] I see the obvious snag, namely that it looks like dividing up the French Empire...", 23 July 1940), and finds himself waiting, like the Spanish, to see the outcome of the Battle of Britain ("...the Spaniards are sitting on the fence until they see how the invasion of England, and possibly Egypt, goes. They are convinced that they will get something for certain out of the war in Africa, and an arrangement about Gibraltar...", 7 August 1940). In later letters he warns against breaking with Petain and suspects de Gaulle of lacking support, worries about the unpopularity of the US in Spain, and expresses concern that the Spanish might join the war in early 1941 and again after the invasion of the USSR. His support for Churchill remains qualified ("...Winston has the faults of his qualities, and one of them is that being a better talker than anyone else, he is disinclined to listen to other people...", 2 May 1941) but he is full of praise for Beaverbrook's own role in government: "Your aeroplanes saved the Battle of Britain and your tanks have been the decisive instruments in the Battle of Libya" (23 December 1941).